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Individuals and groups are often subjected to power, both public and
private, by eliciting their consent. Debate usually focuses on whether or
not that consent is freely given or is vitiated by imbalances of strength
between the bargaining parties. This essay focuses on a different issue,
one that is largely passed over in legal and moral analyses: how far does
and should consent bind one to accepting in advance changes in the
future? There are signs of a fundamental shift in answering this
question-a shift that particularly concerns the control of power in the
economy. Industrial democracies may be abandoning a conception of
consent rooted in the model of the social contract. They may be moving
toward a conception that requires the consenting parties to take on risks
about the future that are more thoroughgoing and potentially damaging
than would be allowed under the earlier model. Examples of this
phenomenon will be drawn primarily from two domains in which issues
of consent to economic power are central: employment law and
international investment law. The evolution of legal principles of consent
at work here will be critically evaluated with the help of the tools of
political theory. It is an analysis that deliberately selects examples in
order to illustrate positions rather than to provide an exhaustive account
of the prevalence in different countries and sectors of the problems
highlighted. The latter is a task for follow-up empirical investigation.
INTRODUCTION
The dimensions of "statehood" are shifting, along with those of the
state itself. The latter refers to an institution, the former to the
rationale and legitimacy of that institution. The former will, of course,
affect the course of the latter: its vision of statehood, explicit or implicit,
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guides the state as it widens or shrinks the scope of its own powers and
varies the division of labor between itself and bodies lying outside of it.
Changes in conceptions of the mission of the state have sometimes
led beyond drawing a stark contrast between the principles regulating
public and private power and toward a synthesis of principles governing
the exercise of power per se-be it located within the state or outside of
it-in civil society. One vantage point from which we can watch this
convergence of public and private standards is through a fundamental
value on which the legitimate exercise of power is often grounded:
consent. My focus here is on the way consent is able to reach into the
future so as to anticipate changes. Change may be the concern of an
enterprise as it reworks its structure and strategy and presents
employees with the demand that they follow along, on the grounds that
the employees consented in advance to a given alteration. It may also be
a concern of the state itself as it alters its public policy objectives and
tries to refute claims that the state consented in advance to an
agreement with an investing business that the state would not impose
the cost of such policy changes on that business.
In both of these cases, as well as others to be mentioned, there is a
shift in the way these undertakings about the future are regulated.
I. CONSENTS AND FUTURES: SOME EXAMPLES
Consent to Change in Employment Conditions
A rich source of principles governing consent to change can be found
in the workplace. Employment law, until recently, has offered what can
be called the classical model of protection of the vulnerable from the
impact of radical change.1 It also reveals shifts away from that model.
In the approach to employment rights that has held in many industrial
democracies through much of the twentieth century, the state has
enforced a floor of protected entitlements for the employee. Some of
these guarantees operate via statute, such as minimum wage or non-
discrimination requirements, while other guarantees arise via law
developed in the courts. The latter contribute to setting up the initial
expectations of the employee and employer about, for example, the wage
over and above the statutory minimum and the content of the job to be
done, as well as other core conditions that mark the reasons for which
the contract was entered into by the employee and employer in the first
place. At the same time, the parties project their relationship into the
1. Here I focus on U.K. employment law for the purpose of illustrating the
phenomenon.
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future. Here the law has traditionally allowed the employer to impose a
certain degree of change unilaterally, that is, without needing to obtain
fresh consent from the employee because acceptance was implied in the
initial undertaking. This embraced reasonable changes in conditions of
work arising from shifts in the enterprise's structure or strategy.
2
It is here that the problem of the reach of consent arises. Everything
turns on the scope of the employer's prerogative unilaterally to impose
changes to the terms and conditions of employment initially agreed. In
the classical picture, the agreement given in the initial contract commits
the worker to accept some changes to the terms of the working
relationship but not changes that are so severe that, had he been faced
with these conditions at the outset, he would never have taken the job.3
It is, for example, one thing for a school teacher to agree in advance that
she will need to adapt to new computer technology as an aid to doing
her job but quite another to be required to accept a new computer
program which largely obviates the need for her to exercise judgment in
interpreting material and evaluating student responses.
On the classical approach, she cannot be taken to have consented in
advance to the latter outcome: a change that works so much to her
disadvantage that, had she been presented with this condition of work
at the outset, she would not have wanted the job. This does not mean
that such a change cannot be proposed by the employer, and formally
accepted by the employee. But if it is, this would be a fundamental
alteration of the existing contract, and the employee's fresh consent
would be necessary.
4
This protective principle is weakening. That is, agreements that
bind employees may commit them in advance to accept changes that
leave them in a substantially worse position than they were when they
initially agreed to their terms of employment.5 This result stems from
the fact that individual consent in the workplace is changing in its force
and meaning. It has begun to break free of its classical limits and is
2. See SIMON DEAKIN & GILLIAN S. MORRIS, LABOUR LAW 295 (6th ed. 2012).
3. See id. (stating that the employee's implied duty not to obstruct new technology or
new forms of work organization does not extend to overriding the employee's core
expectations regarding pay, hours of work, or employee benefits on which there was initial
agreement with the employer).
4. If the employee does not give consent, the dismissal is not automatically illegal. If
the employee rejects the change, she is then entitled to make the employer justify the
firing, which it may or may not succeed in doing, under the special reasons specified by
laws governing the fairness of dismissal. See HUGH COLLINS ET AL., LABOUR LAw 162-177
(2012).
5. See, for example, the principles formulated in the U.K. cases of Cresswell v. Board
of Inland Revenue [1984] Ch.D. 508 at 509; and Carlton Henry v. London General Transp.
Services [2002] EWCA (Civ) 488, [26].
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being replaced by a conception according to which the consenting
individual embraces a radically larger field of risk-a gamble in which
he hopes he will continue to gain from future changes but accepts in
advance that he may end up much worse off. This is what we find in
"flexibility" clauses in employment contracts that obligate the employee
to accept any task the employer sets.
6
To anticipate the discussion to come, the classical conception of
consent implies the acceptance of what can be called restricted risk
about the future, opening the employee to a limited set of possible
changes he is deemed to have accepted beforehand. This is being
replaced by a conception of consent as a commitment in advance to a
much wider set of possible changes. I call this the assumption of
extended risk about the future. In what follows, these two species will
be referred to as restricted and extended consent, respectively.
Consent o Change in International Economic Law
The emergence of extended consent is a phenomenon that is not
limited, of course, to employment relations but reaches into many other
domains in which the regulation of power and the management of
change are brought together. My second example concerns the state
itself as one of the parties to an agreement with a private party. A
salient illustration is that of contracts for investment. In these
contracts, private companies undertake major projects for host
countries, and the latter in turn give undertakings that the companies
seek, aimed at making their investments secure and profitable. In
pursuing this objective, international economic law displays a
movement away from the principle that the state cannot tie its hands by
certain contractual promises to those under its power. This principle is
usually reflected in the classical notion in domestic legal systems that
the state cannot agree to be bound not to change a policy that is central
to its responsibility to further the public interest-a duty that may call
for shifting priorities over time, including those concerning fundamental
rights that need protecting.7 Protecting a right might, on the classical
6. Consider the following clause from a specimen contract: "[t]he Company reserves
the right to vary these terms and conditions for operational, commercial or financial
reasons according to the needs of the business." COLLINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 109. Such
a clause "provides the employer with an apparent power to vary any term of the contract
unilaterally for business reasons." Id. at 172.
7. See PETER CANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 145 (3d ed. 1996). The
state retains the equivalent freedom to alter its commitments for what are called special
administrative contracts granting a concession, which is a species of contract that would
be vulnerable to alteration in the public interest. For an analysis of the line between
consents by the state that are and are not legitimately binding, see Susan Rose-Ackerman
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view, have to take priority over the enforcement of a contract if the
latter unduly limits the former. Contracts with private parties cannot be
allowed to shrink the state's policy space-a space that must leave room
for government to change course at its discretion in order to respond to
these fluid needs.
8
Investors often see this as a problem-a gap that needs filling. In
the name of stabilizing investment expectations, investment contracts
often contain promises by the state not to apply changed law to an
investment, with significant damages for breach. International arbitral
tribunals are usually given the mission of interpreting and giving effect
to these contracts, and they largely uphold this approach.9 These
decisions insist that the state can be bound by its consent to precisely
the undertakings that classical domestic public law forbids.10 This is
accomplished by crossing two streams of legal principle: that which
governs state contracts under domestic and private international law on
the one hand and that which governs treaties under public international
law on the other. In order to take advantage of the analogy with
treaties, the contract is "internationalized," a label that allows the
tribunal to appeal to the principle, central to the law of treaties, of pacta
sunt servanda.11 This is accompanied by borrowing the principle of
international law that the state, in making a treaty, will not normally
be allowed to appeal to any domestic constitutional limitations on its
capacity to make binding promises in such an agreement.
12
Public and private international law here can combine forces to
strengthen the grip of private economic actors over the state. For
example, over the lifetime of an investment project, such as the
development of an ore deposit, a state that is relatively poor may find
that it is bound by a human rights treaty to improve legal standards
protecting the health and safety of workers but may face the obstacle of
having given its prior promise not to change the law applied to the
investor's project. Rather than pay damages for breach of contract-the
state itself compensating the business for the higher cost of worker
& Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, n. 110 (2000). See
also M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 293 (3d ed.
2010).
8. SORNARAJAH, supra note 7.
9. A classic example is the arbitral decision in Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53
I.L.R. 389 (1977).
10. For contrast, see SORNARAJAH, supra note 7.
11. That is, "agreements must be kept," a principle of international law discussed in
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 244, 296.
12. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, 27 Jan. 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty.").
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:1
safety-the state may prefer to withhold the higher level of health and
safety protection from the project.
1
As different as this example may seems from employment, the two
share the transition from a restricted to an extended assumption of risk
via the instrument of consent. Try as it might, the state cannot tie itself
via contract to a fixed set of policy goals under national law.
Government has a notionally fiduciary role in relation to its subjects,
which contracts cannot be allowed to prejudice. But as government
moves into the arena of international investment agreements, things
change: it can find itself tied to a far more thorough undertaking that
could lead it, for fear of paying substantial damages, to act against the
public interest that government is meant to further.
Consent as Renunciation of Basic Rights
A final set of examples illustrates a different but allied problem. We
find situations in which private parties consent to renounce-to
alienate-a basic right. This might happen, for example, when
employees are permitted to agree to give up their rights not to be
unfairly dismissed in exchange for shares in the company14 or to give up
their trade union rights in exchange for cash.1 5 These situations again
raise questions about the appropriate reach of consent. Can agreements
legitimately extend so far as to remove the very presence of a basic
right, or does it properly come up against a limit: a set of basic,
inalienable rights? The new face of consent is open to invitations to
renounce these rights, an invitation that consent based on restricted
risk would refuse.
To return to the example of investment agreements, states too may
consent to renounce such rights on behalf of their citizens, as when they
agree with companies that the latter can establish themselves in certain
zones in which a much weakened version of trade union rights is on
offer or in which other employment rights will not apply at all.1 6 In
13. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL U.K., HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE LINE: THE BAKU-
TIBILISI-CEYHAN PIPELINE PROJECT passim (2003).
14. See Growth and Infrastructure Act, 2013, c. 27 § 31(1) (U.K.).
15. These agreements were attempted by a past U.K. government but found by the
European Court of Human Rights to be in violation of the European Convention. See
Wilson, Nat'l Union of Journalists & Others v. United Kingdom, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 49;
Sheldon Leader, Human Rights, Power, and the Protection of Free Choice, in STRATEGIC
VISIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KEVIN BOYLE 81-90 (Geoff Gilbert et
al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Human Rights].
16. See, e.g., INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED
CORE LABOUR STANDARDS IN NIGERIA 2-4 (2011) (pointing to instances in which Nigerian
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doing this the state might purport to be acting with the democratic
consent of its citizens but in a "compartmentalized" fashion:17 that is,
some of those deemed to be -within the democratic consensus, and
working in zones without trade union rights or a minimum wage, are
taken to have agreed to the possibility of finding themselves in dire
need of precisely those rights that the state has, on their behalf,
foregone.
In all of these situations, both public and private, the logic and force
of consent is shifting.
II. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AS BENCHMARK
The concrete examples I have given all involve matching a situation
prior to an agreement with one that comes after it. But, with respect to
changes in an organization's future, what force is there in asking about
the past, about whether the losses that an individual or group might
have agreed to shoulder are fair by comparison with their situations
before the agreement was made? Theories of the social contract give us
the most thorough attempt to answer this question. While they vary
among themselves, the contractarian theories that most closely map the
contours of my topic all invoke a precontractual situation.18 This is
expressed as Locke's "state of nature"'19 or, more recently, as Rawls's
"original position."20 Though differing from one another, these theories
have in common a comparison of situations prior to agreement on the
fundamental principles governing society with the actual principles that
operate once the agreement has been made. The latter are justified to
the extent that they match the former. We can use the logic of these
theories as a benchmark against which to measure the modern face of
consent. When we do this, special features of that modern face emerge.
workers are deprived of benefits of unionization due to government relations with private
enterprises).
17. This point was suggested to me by Daniel Augenstein.
18. It is a model that has flaws, not least to do with its vulnerability to the ideological
manipulation of what counts as "natural" within the set of elements that one notionally
quits the state of nature in order to preserve. Does private property belong there? Does the
interest in freedom from association alongside the freedom to associate belong there?
These clear reasons for being skeptical of some attempts to read off a set of natural rights
from the qualities of a state of nature should not weaken its attraction for our present
purposes. For consideration of Marx's critique of consent, arguing that he did not wholly
reject its relevance, see Sheldon Leader, Inflating Consent, Inflating Function, and
Inserting Human Rights, in CAPITAUSM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 28-47 (J. Dine and A. Fagan
eds., 2005).
19. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, chs. II, IX § 131
(Laslett ed. 1960).
20. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971).
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A. Consent as Assumption of Two Types of Risk
In the employment example, and in the example of state promises to
investors, we have seen that the parties look into the future and take a
risk that the relationship with one another will not work out as each
hoped it would. As indicated earlier, there are two ways of
understanding that reach into the future: as the assumption of
restricted risk and of extended risk. The restricted-risk conception
draws a baseline. This line fixes the basic interests to be protected in
order for it to make sense for someone to leave the precontractual order
and submit to the contractual order. For any given individual, if those
basic interests are not protected, then his consent has reached its limit,
since, as Locke puts it, "no rational creature can be supposed to change
his condition with an intention to be worse."21 Above that line, one takes
the risk of not being in as good a position as he had hoped to be, but he
is still legitimately required to submit to that order. The employee, in
my example, would have to accept changes he may prefer to avoid, so
long as they do not undermine the whole reason for his being in this
particular employment.22 He does not consent to being pushed below
that baseline. Change to which the employee can be taken to have given
his consent is always, on this approach, shadowed by change to which
he did not consent.
It is tempting to criticize this restricted-risk conception of consent as
a charter for unworkable fragmentation: different people within a group
consenting to an arrangement might enter into the same agreement
with different initial expectations. The restricted-risk conception
requires comparison of any given change with the initial expectations
about the future, distributed among the individuals entering a contract
with the same organization, and does so in order to have a benchmark
for deciding how radical a subsequent change proposed by that
organization is. If so, then these expectations among the entrants are
many and various, opening the way to a cumbersome need to assess
21. "But though Men, when they enter into Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and
Executive Power they had in the State of Nature, into the hands of the Society, to be so far
disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the Society shall require; yet it being only
with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and Property;
([flor no rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be
worse) the power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be suppos'd
to extend farther than the common good . See LOCKE, supra note 19, § 131 (emphasis
in original).
22. The state in our example would have to accept that its citizens might not benefit
from some of its social regulations that apply elsewhere in society because of the
stabilization clause signed-but which are not such an extreme reduction of that
protection that the state's legitimate authority over those who lose out has vanished.
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situations case-by-case in order to see if the contract has been broken.
However, this painstaking inspection of the position of each individual
was not what Locke had in mind, nor could any workable protocol for
determining consent to the exercise of power. When Locke says that "no
rational creature can be supposed to intend to be worse-off' as a result
of leaving the state of nature, he is not saying that the postcontractual
situation is in all respects better than the precontractual one for any
given individual. It is only in some respects that this is so, namely with
respect to the core interests in the preservation of liberty and property
that are better provided for by legitimate government. These constitute
the reasons for consenting to leave the state of nature, and if the terms
are not satisfied, the consent has reached its limit. This is a shared
baseline, identified as natural rights by Locke.23 There are many other
things that any given individual might also want and entertain as a
precontractual expectation-such as the prospect of becoming a large
land owner-and which might be added to this individual's set of basic
reasons he had for giving his consent. But these reasons do not, for
Locke, count. That degree of deference to each individual's particular
expectations would indeed fragment the polity. Only the fundamentally
important interests that all share are distilled in the representative
individual whom Locke calls a "rational creature," which sets the reason
for and limits to consent.
The present argument aims to transpose Locke's logic to the wider
settings in our previous examples. Consider the earlier case of a teacher
who agrees to accept future "changes in her mode of work" without any
further specification of what this phrase means in her contract. The
employer might claim that by this undertaking she had in advance
agreed to, for example, computers taking over all exercise of judgment
in teaching and evaluating students, reducing her to the manager of a
machine. On a restricted-risk conception of consent this would not be
acceptable. To allow her initial consent to have this grip on her future
would arguably force her to accept a transformation of the profession
into one that she and others like her would never have wanted to enter
had they been asked at the outset.
24
The rival, extended conception of consent, by way of contrast, does
signal willingness to run the risk of being pushed below that baseline. It
thereby introduces a radically different way in which consent manages
the relationship between individuals, the organizations affecting them,
and their futures. It is a conception that cuts its moorings to the core
23. See LOCKE, supra note 19, § 149.
24. This would, in turn, be different from a demand by a particular teacher that she
remain working with students of a particular age group when no specific undertaking
about this had been made.
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principles underlying the social contract, substituting for them a quite
distinct approach. By accepting radical loss as well as radical benefit as
possible outcomes, there is no longer a need to compare, for each and
every concerned individual, his position before and after the entry into
the consensual arrangement. Instead, by accepting the extended set of
outcomes each individual faces a shrunken entitlement to peer back into
the past so as to see how far his legitimate expectations have or have
not been met. His room for legitimate dissent-grounded on the
frustration of those expectations-is reduced.
Having lost this anchor to the particular expectations of the
contracting individuals, consent becomes an instrument by which those
individuals are tied more closely to the full range of outcomes that their
relationship generates in the future. Consent becomes more of a linking
device, binding people to institutions, and less of a protective device,
preserving people from abuse by those institutions. As such, consent
becomes an effective tool of policy. Organizations, both public and
private, can work toward results that benefit some while leaving others
less well off than they were when contemplating membership, while the
latter are not in a position to claim that the agreements affecting their
futures have been violated. All are carried along by the same initial ,and
far-reaching undertaking to accept a wide range of outcomes.25 This
approach can dramatically weaken the force of individuals' control over
their material lives. It moves them away from a stable environment and
closer to the instability exemplified by the casualized laborer.
B. Consent as Renunciation of Basic Rights
The choice between the restricted and extended species of consent
can carry yet more radical consequences. The latter allows basic rights
to be renounced while the former draws a boundary, marking these
rights as inalienable. In political economy, the possibility of such
renunciation is the fruit of a conception of statehood that lessens the
burden of basic rights on "dynamic" enterprise by inserting the
consenting individual, and, with due adjustments, the consenting state,
between those rights and limits on their exercise. This development
provokes an old and fundamental question: why does, and why should,
someone agree to give up-to alienate-a right in this way?
So long as there is no coercion or fraud, there are two likely reasons.
The first is that the right has little value to the persons giving it up
25. Sheldon Leader, Inflating Consent, Inflating Function, and Inserting Human
Rights, in CAPITALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 28-47 (Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan eds.,
2005).
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because they do not expect to avail themselves of it. The second is that,
even though the right does mean a great deal to them, something they
want even more will not be available if the right is retained. In the
context of employment, for example, an employer might be willing to
provide work only on condition that the applicant agree to forego his
rights against unfair dismissal. Similarly, in the context of state
investment contracts, investors might demand that if they are to engage
the project the state must renounce certain key employee or land rights
of local populations.26 The call to contract away the right is often
informally buttressed with the observation that "half a loaf of bread is
better than none."
The extended conception of consent accepts this logic. A restricted
conception, following the logic of a social contract, rejects it. Putting the
two alongside one another helps to track this important change in the
state's view of its proper role. For the extended conception, if I agree
that I renounce my right, say, to join a union, this is properly grounded
in my estimate that I will not need the union in the future. There is no
difference, from this perspective, between deciding not to join a union
because I simply do not want to and my agreeing to give up my basic
right to do so. The latter is simply a projection into the future of my
estimate of where my preferences will lie, and, in agreeing not to join, I
take the gamble that my preferences on this point will not change. If
they do change, so much the worse for me. On the restricted conception,
there is a fundamental difference between deciding to do or not to do
what you have a clear ight to do, and going further to give up the right
to choose to do or not to do that thing.27 The right lies within a realm
that-on the restricted conception of consent-one's agreement cannot
remove.
Why not? Here we need to amend the answers given by the classical
social contractarians to fit modern conditions while staying within the
spirit of their argument.28 Take the example of agreeing to forego the
26. See, e.g, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 13.
27. See generally Terrance McConnell, The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights, 3
LAW & PHIL. 25, 47-48 (1984) (citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS I AND II 112
(Herbert W. Schneider ed., 1958)) ("There are some rights, Hobbes says, which are such
that a person could never benefit by transferring or relinquishing them. The right ... to
resist assault is, Hobbes claims, such a right .... What a person cannot give up is the
right to choose whether to resist an assault.").
28. See McConnell, supra note 27, at 44-52 (explaining the views of Locke, Hobbes,
and Rousseau). See generally Sheldon Leader, Freedom and Futures: Personal Priorities,
Institutional Demands and Freedom of Religion, 70 MOD. L. REV. 713, 713-30 (2007)
[hereinafter Freedom and Futures] (introducing two hypothetical situations to illustrate
fundamental issues of ethics and law concerning choice); Human Rights, supra note 11, at
82-84 (arguing that "the law of human rights which deals with the basic liberties is not
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right to join a trade union. It is one thing for me to decide not to join a
particular trade union, and quite another for me to agree to give up the
right to choose whether or not to join the union at all. Renouncing the
latter fails to recognize that many basic rights are devices attuned to
the right holder's changing priorities.29 The basic right to join a union is
as available to the sworn enemy of such organizations as it is to their
staunch advocate. Equally, the right to manifest one's religious belief is
as available to an atheist as it is to the devout. It is there for the former
in the event that she changes her convictions, sometimes without
choosing to,30 and hence her priorities. The message behind this feature
of the right is that no one can know the future on this point, and one
therefore cannot be bound in advance to ignore a priority in life that one
cannot foresee having.
To declare someone unable to alienate a right is not to treat her
paternalistically. Inalienability is not imposed because someone else
knows her future better than she does. It is rather that the shape of the
future along these axes cannot be known by anyone. This is precisely
what a conception of consent as the extended assumption of risk refuses
to acknowledge. It holds the individual to the priorities expressed at the
outset, with no room for revision later. It is such revision that the
partial risk conception of consent, by contrast, permits.
To alienate a basic right might also undermine its significance in
the social order. For example, if an employer can buy an employee's
entitlement to accept or refuse trade union membership, then the whole
reason for having this right in civil society is undermined. The right is
designed to be exercised based on the qualities of the union offering
itself as a representative of employee interests. The individual
concerned should therefore decide for or against union membership on
its own merits, not on the basis of its merits as mixed with the collateral
attractions of accepting a reward. The right to join a union is like the
right to vote. The latter is designed to reflect the voter's evaluation of
candidates on their own merits; a reward for voting a particular way, or
not voting at all, is objectionable because of the extraneous motives it
introduces. The extended conception of consent invites the influence of
these extraneous motives; the restricted conception protects against
such influence.
best understood, in its most fundamental form, as a way of controlling imbalances of
power.").
29. See Freedom and Futures, supra note 28, at 718-19 ('Through time.., this pattern
of priorities may change: a new value may displace another as the most important. The
person who quietly congratulates or condemns herself may do so for reasons that she
would have scarcely recognized some years previously.").
30. See id. at 720.
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C. "Half a Loaf Is Better Than None"
The most prevalent form of alienation of basic rights involves an
invitation to sacrifice one basic right in order to enjoy another. This is
often accompanied by the warning that if the former is not given up,
then the latter will not be available. As seen in the earlier examples,
there are many such situations. An impoverished state may be told by a
potential investor that a project will only be undertaken if health and
safety laws, or laws protecting local farmers from expropriation, are
held static while the protections in the rest of the country continue to
increase. An employer might, to elaborate on the earlier example,
demand that an employee accept a weaker set of job protection rights,
otherwise there will be no job at all. Such proffered trade-offs extend, of
course, beyond the pressures exerted in the world economy. It is also
what is on offer, for example, when citizens are asked by the state to
choose between the preservation of their right to privacy and their
protection from clandestine terrorists.
In each of these situations the state often insists that it is satisfying
rather than foregoing respect for a human right and that it is doing so
with the consent of those involved. In fact, this position abandons a key
feature of consent as it figures in the logic of a social contract. A state of
nature is a set of disadvantages from which one wants to move away; it
is not a single disadvantage. On Locke's approach, for example, one has
a reason for leaving the state of nature in order to secure the protection
of physical possessions but also to gain freedom from arbitrary power
such as can be provided by an impartial judiciary. If one were to have
proposed to Locke as a reason for leaving the state of nature the
protection of property alone-at expense of putting up with arbitrary
dictatorial government-he would likely have deemed her to have lost
the plot. She would have failed to appreciate that the vulnerabilities
Locke described were all of a piece and cannot be disaggregated. The
concern is to protect a range of rights, which the protection of a single
right could not deliver.
To preserve the whole set of rights, and to refuse that one be
sacrificed to another, is not an invitation to impasse. Here there is an
important distinction between a legitimate compromise between one
basic right and another, when it is not possible to maximally satisfy
either, and a long-range sacrifice of one basic right to another. A
strategy of compromise between competing rights will give priority to
one over the other but under the condition that the incursion be a fair
balance-not a sacrifice of one to the other. To compromise between
competing rights means ensuring that in any given case one has found
the solution that gives adequate space for each. If this does not
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happen-if one right takes automatic priority because the other has
been renounced at the outset-then the right that survives becomes a
vortex, absorbing and relegating to second place all other potentially
rival interests in all circumstances.
To see what is lost by this strategy, consider the competition
between the well-recognized right to life and the equally well-recognized
right to freedom of movement.31 Preservation of life is ultimately more
important than is the interest in freedom of movement, say, along the
highway. But it is not true that each and every death risk level is more
important than is any given level of freedom of movement.32 Assume
that evidence shows that the death rate on a highway is reduced by a
significant but decreasing number for every mile per hour of reduction
in permitted speed. Assume that the reduction is 10,000 deaths per year
in a given population for every mile per hour of reduction between 100
and 90 mph; 1,000 deaths from 50 to 40 mph; 100 from 40 to 20 mph; 10
from 20 to 10 mph. At a certain point a polity may, and sometimes
must, reverse the direction of compromise. In this example, it must at a
certain point limit the attention paid to the risk of death in favor of the
right to freedom of movement, however clearly a certain number of
deaths are linked to a further reduction in speed. Freedom of movement
is usually prized less than is the right to life, but it does normally carry
some weight in most polities, and to the degree that it does it enters into
this minimal competition with the need to prevent deaths on the
highway. Even though the preservation of life is ultimately more
important than is freedom of movement, it does not follow that the right
to freedom of movement must always be adjusted downward so as to
have the least impact on the death rate. Yet, such would be the case if
the right to freedom of movement was removed at the outset as a basic
entitlement in order to allow maximum room for the right to life to
flourish.
It follows from this argument that the pursuit of one basic right
should not systematically prevail over another right whenever the two
compete. To give one right such automatic preference can deprive the
polity of one of the tools for spreading responses over the range of
situations that may arise in the future. If a state gives up one basic
31. An example drawn from Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503 (1989).
32. Cf. Waldron, supra note 31, at 509-12, 516-18 (1989) ("For example, if an
individual's interest in speaking freely is important enough to justify holding the
government to be under a duty not to impose a regime of political censorship, it is likely
also to be sufficiently important to generate other duties .... ). See also Sheldon Leader,
Collateralism, in 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: HuMAN RIGHTS 53,
60-61 (Roger Brownsword, ed., 2004) ("[W]hen basic rights compete with one another,
civic principles require that the exercise of one such right is not always to be compromised
in favour of another.").
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right of its citizens to allow them to enjoy the goods protected by
another right, that state is prevented from dealing with those situations
in which common sense and sound ethics would call for a change in
priorities. It may be that there are certain situations in which, for
example, the enjoyment of the right to privacy has to be compromised in
favor of enjoyment of the right to life. But, as with the example of the
highway, there are points at which any marginal gain in protection of
life is not worth the degree of loss of the right to privacy. Judging when
that point is reached is, of course, difficult. But it is nothing compared
with the difficulty faced by a society without an effective right to
privacy, or a right to a fair trial, so that the right to life can gain an
extra margin of protection.
CONCLUSION
This is a plea for a reinstatement of a conception of statehood that is
faithful to the inspiration of theories of the social contract. Stripped of
its ideological clothing, whereby what is deemed "natural" is in fact a
label behind which are concealed contingent special interests,33 it is a
logic that is relevant to some of the most important contemporary
concerns about the abuse of public and private power. In this area,
public and private options begin to converge, and solutions that are
faithful to human rights are increasingly available to both domains on
the same terms. This plea for a restricted conception of consent is as
applicable in the private domain as it is in the public.
Furthermore, the plea for a restricted conception has nothing to do
with the balance of power between the weak and the strong. The
warnings against a use of consent to lead people to gamble with
fundamental parts of their futures is a warning that holds as much for
those able to bargain on an equal footing with the other party as it is for
those facing weak bargaining positions. The protection of the most
vulnerable calls for yet further tools, highlighting areas in which the
need for extra protection via extra bargaining strength is acute. In so
doing, a polity may still fundamentally build on the heritage of the
social contract, which is meant to be at the disposal of all.
33. See generally Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG
MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216 (Loyd D. Easton & Kurt H. Guddat, eds. trans.,
1967) (arguing that religion will play a prominent role in the secular state and that
economic inequality will always bind individuals to material constraints on freedom); C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE
(1962) (arguing that the "possessive quality" of individualism in classical liberalism
constructs society as little more than a system of economic relations rooted in property).
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When the state endorses a fresh species of consent, it is shifting the
ground of its own rationale and legitimacy. It is the state that finally
shapes and authorizes the types of agreement that will bind in the
private as well as public sectors. Its move from a restricted to an
extended conception of legitimate risk to which one consents is
ultimately its initiative and responsibility. The move certainly has its
reasons, often expressed in terms of economic efficiency and
institutional efficacy, allowing the polity to hold its own among
international competitors. But the social and individual cost is high. We
should not hide this cost beneath the cloak of saying to someone whose
basic rights are weakened and who is thereby made a great deal worse
off, "but you did agree after all."
